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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
ST.l\TE OF UTAH 
STl\TE OF UTA!!, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,· 
--vs-
Case No. 
15509 
Gl\RY WILLil'..C1 DANIELS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S'I'ATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with the crime of theft, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404 (1953 as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty by a jury of the 
crime charged on October 6, 1977, in the Third District Court, 
tl;cc Honorable L!ay E. Banks presiding. The appellant wa.s 
sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison 
not to exceed 15 years, as provided by law. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmc.rnce of the verdict 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts in this case are not disputed. Sometii''' 
during the evening of June 14, 1977, the appellant and a en-', 
. I 
panion took a 1968 Corvette from the sales lot of Midvalley:j 
in Sandy, Utah (T.48,7). 
The appellant stated that he was in Salt Lal:e Cic. 
to visit relatives, and that his residence was in Alameda, 
California (T. 46). During his stay in Salt Lake the vehicle I 
I 
had used to drive from California to Salt Lake was impoundec' 
(T.46) and he was unsuccessful in securing its release (T.~;' 
The appellant was unable to borrow money from members of hi: 
family, and testified that he took the car to get to his hor0! 
in California (T.47). 
The appellant and his companion set out for Califc:·t 
in the evening of June 14 and were stopped by a California 
Highway Patrolman outside of Turckee, California the next 
morning, after a chase in which the cars drove at speeds weli 
over 100 miles per hour and the engine in the Corvette hl~ 
out (T. 28-29). The owner of the lot from which the car Has 
taken testified that at the time he got the car back, about 
30 days later, approximately $1750 worth of damage had ~~ 
-2-
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inrll rred (T. 8) . Prior to the car's removal, it had been 
rebuilt ('l'.6) · 
The appellant was booked for reckless driving and 
transported to the Nevada County Sheriff's Office (T.31). At 
that time he represented that he had purchased the car for 
$',875 some four or five months earlier (T.33). Also, at this 
time the car had a Utah 1 icense plate on the rear (T. 3 8) • 
The appellant made no attempt to alter the vehicle 
identification numbers on the car (T.35), and at trial, testi-
fied that at the time he took the car he only had $15. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT ABOUT FACTS 
SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
The appellant admitted at trial that he did steal the 
automobile from the sales lot (T. 4 7) , and his sole defense was 
that he did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of its 
use or value. Whether or not the appellant intended to return 
the car can only be determined from the facts surrounding the 
case. It would be absurd to expect the appellant to admit that 
he intended to permanently deprive the owner of the car when 
his intentions are dispositive of his guilt. tvebber v. State, 
-3-
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376 P.2d 348 (Ok.Cr. 1962). 
The cross-examination complained of by the appe)'. 
is as follows: 
"Q It only cost you $15.00 to get gas 
to go frora here to Truckee, California? 
A No. 
Q Where did you get the rest of your 
money for gas? 
A My friend had a couple dollars, 
and, then, there's other ways. 
Q Would you like to elucidate? 
MR. HILL: I'm going to object. 
TEE COURT: Overruled. 
I 
Q (BY MS. MARLOWE) Tell me how you 
got gas between here and California. 
A What you call a garden hose. 
Q Whnt ~o ycu mean by garden hose? 
A Well, it's a piece of garden hose 
about six feet long. You insert into a gas 
tank, which is commonly known as siphoning. 
Q You siphoned gas or you stole gas 
to get to California? 
A Yes, because I used all my rnoney up 
before I even did that." (T.51, lines 9-27) 
The law in Utah is quite clear on the issue of 
admission of other bad acts: evidence of prior bad acts or 
t he accusei I crimes is not admissible if it merely disgraces 
-4-
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or shows a propensity to commit crime. 
"Ho1·rever, where evidence has special 
r2levancy to prove the crime of which the 
defendant stands charged, it may be allowed 
for that purpose; and the fact that it 
shows another crime will not render the 
evidence inadmissible." 
state v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 at 415 (1961); 
state v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969). 
Evidence is also admissible if it tends to prove 
that the defendant had the intent necessary to commit the crime. 
State v. Torgerson, 4 Utah 2d 52, 286 P.2d 800, (1955). 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence makes specific 
reference to the admissibility of evidence when relevant to 
prove intent: 
.subject to Rules 45 and 48, 
such evidence is admissible when relevant 
to prove some other material fact includ-
ing absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, or identity." 
The evidence would tend to discredit his claim that he did not 
intend to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. State 
v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972). The limitations 
on Rule 55 do not affect admissibility in this court. 
Wigmore states that "we are further reenforced by 
the fundamental canon that admissibility for one purpose is not 
affected by inadmissibility for another." § 218, Wigmore, 
Third Edi ti on. 
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The appellant has failed in his brief to disti' 
nqu~. 
the inadmissibility of prior bad acts from the admissibilit: 
1 
of evidence of acts concurrent with tlle crime charcred·. 
:J 
1Ihe 
testimony complained of is an inadve:::-tent admission of a 
I 
crime committed during the course of the theft of the automoti 
The problem presented by the testimony is one of balancing t·~ 
probative value of the evidence against the danger of pre- l 
i judice to the defendant. State v. Manrigue, 271 Or. 201, 5Jl 
P. 2d 239 (1975). The sole issue in the case at bar was the 
I 
::::::i:: ::e t:::e:::::: and the testimony complained of •n 
1 
There are numerous cases that discuss the admissit::I 
of "concomitant parts of the criminal act." Wigmore on Evic0 j 
§ 218 (Third Edition) . Many cases deal with instances ~ 
which the defendant has been charged with one violent crimn') 
he has in fact committed several at the same time. ~ 
Gibson, 565 P. 2d 783 (Utah 1977); State v. Izatt, 96 Ida 661, 
534 P. 2d 1107 (Idaho 1975). These cases refer to the need I 
present the entire picture of the crime to the jury in allo•.i:·\ 
evidence of other concurrent crimes. However, the "complete I 
I 
picture" theory is not limited to violent crimes. In ~! 
Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970), the appellantwer.:( 
. t' n a robbe'.I on a spree that included a robbery of a gas sta io , 
-6-
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of a service station and another establishment, the theft 
of a car, and a conspiracy to rob a theatre and cafe. The 
defendant was convicted for his role in the robbery of the gas 
station, and on appeal alleged prejudicial error after the 
trial court permitted his accomplice to testify as to the other 
crimes committed on the same night as the crime for which he 
was charged. The court took note of State v. Lopez, supra, 
and rejected his appeal. 
Tillman v. State, 820 O.Cr. 276, 169 P.2d 223 (1946) 
involved a theft of an auto by three boys. The issue in Tillman 
was the same issue as is before the court in the instant case: 
the intent of the appellant to either retain or return the car. 
In the Tillman case the prosecution was allowed to introduce 
evidence that indicated the defendant, after stealing the car, 
broke into a cafe and then obtained gas without paying for it 
during the time he still had the stolen car. The court admitted 
the evidence of the other crimes as part of the res gestae of 
the crime charged, and at 169 P.2d 227 said: 
"It certainly became competent for 
the state to trace all the actions of 
the accused and his associates during 
their asportation of the stolen property 
for the purpose of showing whether their 
actions were such as to indicate a pur-
pose to permanently deprive the owner of 
his property." 
The testimony complained of in the present appeal 
-7-
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was not an attack on the credibility or truthfulness of th, 
defenr1ant. Nor was it designed to shc.M th;:it the defenda~t 
had a prior history of bad acts. At trial, the appellant's 
attorney made an effort to show that the appellant was no'. 
bent on crime, and that he was merely trying to get home i· 
the only way he could. However, his com..-nission of other c•:·; 
in the course of his efforts to get home is probative ofG 
general intent, which was the only contested issue at tr ii'. 
There was a legitimate purpose to be served by the evidence, 
and the fact that it may also show the comnission of anoU•·r 
crime will not render it inadmissible. State v. Mason, SJP I 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1975). 
The admissibility of evidence of other crimes, 
including the balancing of its probative value against the da:l 
I 
of prejudice, is a matter to be left to the discretion~f 
trial court in each case, subject to reversal only where 
In looking at bi I "clearly wrong." State v. Gibson, supra. 
I, 
total circumstances of the case, and at the abstract natG'.o i 
of the intent issue which was determinative of the case, tre I I 
trial judge acted properly in permitting the cross-examina,:j 
to proceed over appellant's objection. The testimony •35 I 
probative and relevant. 
The appellant, in his brief (p.7) refers~ t~ 
stolen ud judge's improper assumption that items had been 
I 
-8-
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vehicle, and his failure to instruct the jury to disregard the 
testir,;0n~· compL:iinecl of (T. 54) . The judge's comments regarding 
the s tcreo ec1uiur:icnt were ma.de out of the presence of the jury, 
and there was no need to instruct them to disregard those 
conmen ts. In view of the fact that the testimony concerning 
the siphoning was properly admitted there was no need to instruct 
the jury to disregard that testimony. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
CONVINCE A RE!\SONF.BLE JUROR THAT THE APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF 
THE CRil1E FOR l'/HICH HE WAS COi'NICTED. 
The appellant claims that the State has failed to 
meet its burden of proving that he had the requisite intent 
for the crime of theft. In addition, the appellant states 
that in light of State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) and 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976), the State must 
prove 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant had a conscious objective to 
deprive the owner of the vehicle per-
manently or for such an extended period 
of time that a substantial portion of 
the economic'value is lost." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 10-11). 
During the course of the trial, the appellant moved to dismiss 
the action based on this same contention (T.39). The trial 
-9-
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judge noted that the appellant had attached a Utah lic9 H 
plate to the car and driven it across two state lines b i 
eforc I 
he was apprehended (T. 4 0) , and concluded that these facts 
supported a prima facia case against the appellant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as amended) 
"A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof." 
state, 
! 
i 
Section 76-6-401 defines the terms used in § 76+ ! 
404 in the following manner: 
"(1) 'Property' is anything of value .. 
(3) 'Purpose to de!_Jrive' means to have 
the conscious object: (a) to withhold pro-
perty permanently or for so extended a peri~ 
or to use under such circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, 
or of the use and benefit thereof, would be 
lost; or (b) ... (c) .. 
(4) 'Obtain or exercise unauthorized 
control' means, but is not necessarily 
limited to, conduct heretofore defined or 
known as common-law larceny by trespassory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by 
bailee, and embezzlement." I 
The appellant does not contend that the State has :1 
met its burden of proof in regards to § 76-6-401 (1) and l41· 
There remains then only the need to show that appellant acte; 
with an intent to permanently deprive. 
The prosecution had no way to prove 
been after he arrivi:r·. what the appellant's actions would have 
-10-
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at his inten0ed destination of Alameda, California. While 
it is true that the prosecution carries the burden of proof 
(Cornish,~), the Romero court stated at 554 P.2d 218 that 
"[T]he intent to steal or unlawfully 
deprive the rightful owners of their pro-
perty can be inferred by defendant's 
conduct and the attendant circumstances 
testified to by the witness." 
~is was essentially the position of the Illinois Supreme Court 
in People v. Norris, 362 Ill. 492, 200 N.E. 330 (1936), where 
they held that possession coupled with evidence of flight is 
sufficient to sustain a verdict of auto theft. Circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to prove intent. State v. Joseph, 510 
P.2d 69 (Ariz. App. 1973); State v. Romero, supra. The Arizona 
court in State v. Jackson, 101 Ar. 399, 420 P.2d 270 (1966), 
dealt 1oith the issue confronted here and stated that: 
"In considering the evidence of 
appellant's criminal intent, we adhere 
to the view that the wrongful taking 
of another's property, without his 
consent and with no apparent purpose of 
returning it, in the absence of explana-
tory circumstances, evidences an intent 
to deprive the owner permanently of his 
property." (Court's emphasis) 
I 
If ther-= is a quest inn 'I~ to wh.<>thP-r nr n_0t -f:h_e prosecution has 
\ 
met its burden of proof, "The matter of circumstances of the 
intent to deprive should be submitted to the trier of fact." 
~, supra, at 362. 
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The prosecution must make out a prima facia case 
to sustain its burden of proof, Romero, supra, which it di( 
in this case. The intent of the appellant can only be~~ 
I 
strued from his conduct during the event itself. Thejury;f 
free to disregard the appellant's statement that he intende; 
to park the vehicle in front of the police station in Alarr,;,' 
'-''-1 
and they apparently did so. The jury also heard the testimon ( 
I 
to the effect that the defendant represented to the Califorr 1 
I 
Highway Patrol that he had purchased the car several months 
prior to his apprehension (T.33), and that the defenda~ 
I 
attempted to outrun the patrolman at the time he was arreste. j 
(T.28). This evidence is supportive of the jury 
It is important to note that the trial 
verdict. I 
court gave 
proper instructions for both the theft and joy-riding 
offenses (R. 23-28), wh±ch included the statement that the 
burden of proof is on the prosecution (R.22,26,27). 
for determining the insufficiency of evidence is set 
Romero, supra, as follows: 
"it [must] be so inconclusive or so 
inharently improbable that reasonable 
minds could not reasonably believe 
defendant had committed a crime." 
' 
The std 
forth i: I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
h 19 -s) stat~·! See also State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272, (Uta I ; -
23 w:I Logan, 563 P. 2d 811, (Utah 1977) and State v. Harless, 
2d 128, 459 P.2d 210 (1969). i 
-12-
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It is not the Supreme Court's prerogative to weigh 
evidence. That function is reserved for the finder of fact. 
state v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). This court needs 
only to decide whether or not the prosecution made out a prima 
facia case at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge acted properly when he allowed the 
defendant to testify to the effect that he siphoned gas from 
other vehicles during the course of his trip. The testimony 
was probative of the appellant's intent. In addition, there 
was adequate evidence to support the jury verdict. Romero, 
supra. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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